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WHO DECIDES?:  CIVIL CONSENT 
JURISDICTION OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGES 
AND THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 
Eric Lim* 
 
The Federal Magistrates Act permits a U.S. magistrate judge to preside 
over and enter final judgment in a civil case as a district judge would if all 
parties to the case have consented to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction.  
Parties must consent voluntarily and affirmatively—although consent can be 
implied from the circumstances—to protect the parties’ constitutional right 
to have their case heard by an Article III judge.  To vindicate this right, a 
body of jurisprudence has developed distinguishing dispositive matters, for 
which a magistrate judge requires the consent of all the parties in a case to 
rule on the matter, and nondispositive matters, for which a magistrate judge 
does not require the consent of all the parties to rule on the matter.  As to 
third-party motions to intervene, the federal courts of appeals are split:  in 
the Second Circuit, a magistrate judge cannot rule on a third-party’s motion 
to intervene without its consent, while in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, a 
magistrate judge can.  The circuits’ different treatments of a motion to 
intervene before a magistrate judge creates the opportunity for litigation 
gamesmanship and inequities across the circuits:  It is possible for litigants 
to use this nuance in magistrate judge civil consent-based jurisdiction to slow 
down litigation or to unfairly obtain additional review of their motions to 
intervene that they would otherwise not receive if the cases had proceeded 
before a district judge. 
This Note addresses the split between the Second Circuit and the Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits.  It ultimately argues in favor of the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits’ approach—that magistrate judges should be permitted to rule on a 
third-party’s motion to intervene without its consent in civil cases where the 
original parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge.  This 
Note argues that doing so is within the broad statutory authorization of 
magistrate judge civil consent jurisdiction under the Federal Magistrates Act 
and that the U.S. Constitution does not bar such an interpretation.  This Note 
also argues that the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ jurisprudence ensures that 
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cases proceed expediently and fairly, while avoiding gamesmanship and 
disincentives to magistrate judge jurisdiction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1968, Congress passed the Federal Magistrates Act1 (FMA), authorizing 
a class of judicial adjuncts to assist the U.S. district courts in the efficient 
resolution of criminal and civil matters.2  These judges—for they are 
judges3—are formally known as U.S. magistrate judges.  Their integral role 
in disposing of the wide range of matters with which they are entrusted4 has 
been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.5  The district courts are 
authorized to delegate duties to their magistrate judges at their discretion.6  
The FMA also permits magistrate judges to rule and enter judgment in a case 
as a district judge would upon the consent of the original parties to the 
lawsuit.7  Some circuit courts, though, prohibit magistrate judges from ruling 
on motions brought by litigants wishing to become parties, such as potential 
intervenors,8 whereas others permit magistrate judges to rule on such 
motions.9  In three such cases,10 potential third-party intervenors zealously 
attempted to insert themselves in hard-fought litigations in which the original 
parties had consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction but they—the potential 
intervenors—had not.  When their motions were denied, these potential 
intervenors challenged the magistrate judges’ authority to rule on their 
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 2. See PETER G. MCCABE, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGE SYSTEM 5 
(2014). 
 3. See Michael E. Upchurch, Federal Magistrate Judges:  Origin, Evolution and 
Practice, 80 ALA. LAW. 19, 22 (2019) (“In 1988, the Magistrate Committee of the Judicial 
Conference approved referring to magistrates as ‘Judge’ and addressing magistrates as ‘Your 
Honor.’”). 
 4. See Ruth Dapper, A Judge by Any Other Name?:  Mistitling of the United States 
Magistrate Judge, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015); see also infra Part I.A. 
 5. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1938–39 (2015) (“And it 
is no exaggeration to say that without the distinguished service of these judicial colleagues, 
the work of the federal court system would grind nearly to a halt.”). 
 6. See MCCABE, supra note 2, at 2; see also infra Part I.A. 
 7. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 73(a); infra Part II.B.2.  This Note 
uses “magistrate judge jurisdiction” and similar constructions to refer to the authority of a 
magistrate judge to preside over a “civil consent case.”  This Note uses “civil consent case” to 
refer to cases in which the original named parties have consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(c), to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to preside over and enter judgment in their 
case. 
 8. See infra Part II.A.  This Note uses “potential intervenors” to refer to interested third 
parties who have moved to intervene in a lawsuit prior to the entry of a disposition on their 
motion. 
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. County of Maui, 842 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2016); People 
Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 171 F.3d 1083 (7th Cir. 1999); N.Y. 
Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enters., Inc. (New York Chinese V), 996 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 
1993).   
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motions to intervene without their consent11—perhaps to slow down or 
disrupt the litigation by throwing sand on the litigation tracks via procedural 
or jurisdictional challenges or because they thought a second look by the 
district judge would be to their benefit. 
First, in New York Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enterprises, Inc.12 
(New York Chinese V), a bloc of former controlling shareholders sought to 
intervene13 to challenge a settlement in a copyright infringement case14 after 
the company settled the case against their wishes.15  When the magistrate 
judge denied their motion to intervene, they appealed to the district judge 
claiming that a district judge, rather than a magistrate judge, had to decide 
their motion.16  The Second Circuit agreed.17  Second, in People Who Care 
v. Rockford Board of Education, School District No. 205,18 school board 
members in a district that discriminated against minority students attempted 
to intervene in a long-running school discrimination case—their motion to 
intervene came after a magistrate judge ordered the board to approve a levy 
to fund court-ordered remedies for the past discrimination.19  Third, in Robert 
Ito Farm, Inc. v. County of Maui,20 two public interest citizens’ groups 
moved to intervene to defend a county ordinance prohibiting the cultivation 
of genetically engineered crops in a lawsuit brought by industrial agriculture 
plaintiffs challenging the ordinance.21  In both of these cases, the potential 
intervenors objected to a magistrate judge ruling on their motion to intervene 
without their consent.22  But, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits held that a 
district judge was not required to rule on these motions.23 
The circuit courts differed in their analyses and now differ on whether a 
magistrate judge can rule on a motion to intervene in civil consent cases24 
without the consent of a potential intervenor.  The Second Circuit looked to 
the requirement of consent for waiver of the constitutional right to 
adjudication before an Article III judge in determining that a magistrate judge 
cannot rule on potential intervenors’ motions to intervene unless and until 
 
 11. See Robert Ito Farm, 842 F.3d at 685; People Who Care, 171 F.3d at 1089; New York 
Chinese V, 996 F.2d at 23. 
 12. 996 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 13. Id. at 23. 
 14. N.Y. Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enters., Inc. (New York Chinese VI), 153 
F.R.D. 69, 70 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 43 F.3d 1458 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 15. The settlement amount was for less than the amount of damages and attorneys’ fees. 
See New York Chinese V, 996 F.2d at 22–23. 
 16. Id. at 23. 
 17. Id. at 25; see also infra Part II.A. 
 18. 171 F.3d 1083 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 19. See id. at 1089; infra Part II.B.1. 
 20. 842 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 21. Id. at 684.  Both of the potential intervenors were public interest citizens’ groups. Id. 
 22. See id. at 685; People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 179 
F.R.D. 551, 559 (N.D. Ill. 1998), aff’d, 171 F.3d 1083 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 23. See Robert Ito Farm, 842 F.3d at 685; People Who Care, 171 F.3d at 1089; infra Part 
II.B. 
 24. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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they consent.25  The Seventh and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, looked 
to the broad statutory authorization of magistrate judge jurisdiction in civil 
consent cases in finding that it is within a magistrate judge’s authority to rule 
on a motion to intervene without the potential intervenor’s consent.26  Among 
other effects, these differences in jurisprudence have created inequities both 
within and across circuits in the degree of appellate review available for a 
potential intervenor’s motion to intervene in a civil consent case.27  The 
circuits also now differ on when a potential intervenor’s consent is 
required28:  the Second Circuit requires a potential intervenor’s consent to 
magistrate judge jurisdiction upon filing a motion seeking leave to 
intervene,29 whereas the Seventh and Ninth Circuits do not require the 
consent of the intervenor until the motion has been granted and the intervenor 
has become a party to the lawsuit.30 
This Note argues that, in civil consent cases, magistrate judges should be 
permitted to rule on a potential intervenor’s motion to intervene without 
consent.  This rule is consistent with the FMA’s broad authorization of 
magistrate judge power over the original, consenting parties’ case, does not 
run afoul of the right to adjudication before an Article III court and promotes 
fairness and the expedient resolution of claims while avoiding litigation 
gamesmanship and disincentivizing consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction.  
Part I reviews the role and power of magistrate judges.  Part I also provides 
context on magistrate judges’ status as Article I adjudicators acting as judicial 
adjuncts of Article III courts, waiver of the right to adjudication before an 
Article III court, and intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) 24.  Part II explores the divergent approaches to whether magistrate 
judges may rule on a potential intervenor’s motion to intervene in cases 
where the original parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction but 
where the potential intervenor has not.  Part III then argues that the approach 
taken by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in People Who Care and Robert Ito 
Farm, respectively, which permits magistrate judges to rule on a motion to 
intervene in civil consent cases without the consent of the potential 
intervenor, is the correct approach.  This Note argues that ruling on a 
potential intervenor’s motion to intervene without the intervenor’s consent is 
within the broad statutory authorization of magistrate judge authority in civil 
consent cases and that this approach does not implicate the constitutional 
dimension identified by the Second Circuit in New York Chinese V. 
 
 25. See infra Part II.A. 
 26. See infra Part II.B. 
 27. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 28. These courts—and others as well—hold that a potential intervenor, as a potential late-
coming party, must consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction if and after the motion to intervene 
is granted and the intervenor officially enters the case. See infra note 162 and accompanying 
text.  If the intervenor does not consent, the case is transferred from the magistrate judge back 
to the district judge. See infra note 162. 
 29. See infra Part II.A. 
 30. See infra Part II.B. 
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I.  U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGES:  ROLE, POWERS, AND RELEVANT STATUTES 
Magistrate judges play an integral role in the federal district courts.  They 
dispose of many pretrial civil and criminal matters, increasing access to the 
federal courts in the process.31  Congress created this important position with 
the passage of the FMA,32 but the role of magistrates traces its history back 
to shortly after the founding of the United States.33  Since then, both Congress 
and the courts have entrusted magistrate judges with increasing 
responsibilities and powers.34  Part I.A provides a brief overview of the role 
of magistrate judges, tracing the steady growth of their responsibilities and 
summarizing the types of matters with which they are entrusted.  Part I.B 
summarizes the statutory framework outlining magistrate judges’ jurisdiction 
and powers.  Part I.C then provides background on intervention under FRCP. 
A.  The Role and Responsibilities of the U.S. Magistrate Judge 
Magistrate judges have broad authority, and this authority has grown 
substantially since the role’s creation.35  Since the creation of the role with 
the passage of the FMA,36 magistrate judges have become an integral part of 
the federal district courts, performing a wide variety of functions essential to 
the efficient disposal of cases.37 
Congress passed the FMA in 1968 to help the district courts manage 
burgeoning dockets.38  Under the FMA, magistrate judges were created as 
Article I judicial adjuncts of the Article III courts, who would increase the 
efficiency of the courts by presiding over matters better reserved to 
magistrate judges than to district judges.39  Magistrate judges are subject to 
the complete control of the district courts.40  Under the framework set forth 
in the FMA, magistrate judges are appointed by the district judges of the 
respective courts and exercise the jurisdiction of the district court—they are 
not a separate court or tribunal of their own.41  They can be removed only by 
a majority of the district judges of the district court and only for cause.42   
 
 31. See infra Part I.A. 
 32. See MCCABE, supra note 2, at 4. 
 33. See id. at 3. 
 34. See infra Part I.A. 
 35. See infra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
 36. See MCCABE, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
 37. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1938–39 (2015); infra 
Part I.A. 
 38. See MCCABE, supra note 2, at 2. 
 39. See id. at 5. 
 40. See infra notes 41–42, 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 41. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(a); see also MCCABE, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that the 
appointment of magistrate judges requires public notice of vacancies and candidate screening 
by merit selection panels consisting of lawyers and citizens and that most magistrate judges 
serve full time for eight-year, renewable terms). 
 42. 28 U.S.C. § 631(i) (“Removal of a magistrate judge during the term for which he is 
appointed shall be only for incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental 
disability . . . .”).  Because magistrate judges are authorized by statute, Congress could, at will, 
deauthorize and end the role by statute. Cf. infra note 102. 
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Under the FMA, magistrate judges must be lawyers in good standing with 
the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state, the District of Columbia, or a U.S. 
territory for at least five years.43  Magistrate judges take the judicial oath of 
office44 and are subject to the same standards of discipline and 
disqualification as other federal judges are.45  The district courts are 
authorized to determine how best to use their magistrate judges to meet the 
needs of the court, its judges, and its litigants.46  Accordingly, district judges 
determine what duties to delegate to magistrate judges based on statutory 
authority, local rules, and court orders.47 
Since the passage of the FMA, magistrate judges’ responsibilities have 
increased substantially, and magistrate judges are universally recognized as 
an integral part of the judiciary.48  In 1996, Congress amended the FMA so 
that appeals from the judgments of magistrate judges in civil consent cases 
would be treated the same as appeals from the judgments of district court 
judges—both are now appealable to the circuit courts.49  In 2000, Congress 
gave magistrate judges limited criminal contempt authority.50  And, the 
prestige of the position has increased over the intervening decades:  in 1988, 
the Judicial Conference of the United States “approved referring to 
magistrates as ‘Judge’ and addressing magistrates as ‘Your Honor’” to 
recognize magistrate judges’ role as judges rather than as a “lesser species of 
judicial officer.”51  This change, effective after the passage of the Federal 
Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990,52 acknowledged the 
integral position of magistrate judges within the federal judiciary, as well as 
the role’s ever-expanding responsibilities and duties.53 
 
 43. 28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(1). 
 44. Id. § 631(g). 
 45. 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3066 (3d 
ed. 2019). 
 46. See MCCABE, supra note 2, at 2. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 49. See MCCABE, supra note 2, at 13.  The 1994 version of § 636 permitted the parties in 
a civil consent case to specifically consent to the appeal of decisions of a magistrate judge to 
the district court, rather than to a court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) (1994).  This 
provision was removed by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-
317, § 207, 110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636). 
 50. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-518, §§ 202–203, 114 
Stat. 2410, 2412–2414 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3401, 28 U.S.C. § 636); see also 
MCCABE, supra note 2, at 13; infra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing the 
differences between magistrate judges’ and district judges’ contempt authority). 
 51. Upchurch, supra note 3, at 22. 
 52. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5104 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 53. See Douglas A. Lee & Thomas E. Davis, “Nothing Less Than Indispensable”:  The 
Expansion of Federal Magistrate Judge Authority and Utilization in the Past Quarter Century, 
16 NEV. L.J. 845, 854 (2016) (“The provision is one of nomenclature only and is designed to 
reflect more accurately the responsibilities and duties of the office . . . .” (quoting 
MAGISTRATE JUDGES DIV., OFF. OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, A GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGES SYSTEM 90 (2009), https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/magistrate_judge_legislative_history.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R5K-
VMRE])). 
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In their role as Article I adjudicators, magistrate judges dispose of a wide 
variety of both criminal and civil matters.  Depending on the local rules of a 
district court, their duties can include:  presiding over criminal misdemeanor 
jury trials and imposing sentences; presiding at pretrial criminal proceedings, 
such as initial appearances, bond hearings, and arraignments in both felony 
and misdemeanor cases; issuing arrest and search warrants; handling case 
management in complex civil cases; conducting mediations and settlement 
conferences in civil cases; handling and determining pretrial motions, 
including discovery motions, motions in limine, and motions to intervene; 
recommending a disposition or ruling on summary judgment and other case-
dispositive motions; reviewing administrative appeals, such as Social 
Security determinations; and reviewing federal habeas petitions filed under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2254–2255 and recommending a disposition.54  By permitting 
district courts to delegate these functions to magistrate judges, Congress 
intended to allow district judges to tend to more substantive matters, such as 
conducting trials.55  But as the position was created under Article I of the 
U.S. Constitution, magistrate judges’ exercise of their jurisdiction over these 
varied matters has not been without challenge. 
B.  Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction and the Article III Judicial Power 
In their handling of the many matters that come before them, magistrate 
judges exercise the judicial power of the district courts.  Their jurisdiction is 
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636.56  In civil cases, § 636(b) permits magistrate 
judges to rule on nondispositive pretrial motions referred to them by district 
judges.57  Section 636(b) also permits magistrate judges to recommend 
dispositions in case-dispositive motions referred to them by district judges, 
with the final disposition being determined by the district judge.58  In 
addition, parties may consent to have their cases decided by a magistrate 
judge rather than by a district judge.59  Parts I.B.1 and I.B.2 detail the 
statutory authorization of magistrate judge jurisdiction in the matters that 
come before them both with and without the parties’ consent.60  Part I.B.3 
then discusses magistrate judges’ status as Article I adjudicators, rather than 
as Article III judges, and the source of their adjudicative power.61 
 
 54. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)–(c); Dapper, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that magistrate judge 
duties range from “criminal initial appearances, detention hearings, and arraignments, to civil 
settlement conferences, discovery motions, and consent jury trials”); see also Fed. Magistrate 
Judges Ass’n, United States Magistrate Judges:  Their Function and Purpose in Our Federal 
Courts, U.S. DIST. CT., DIST. OF CONN., http://ctd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ 
FMJA%20Brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/CM3W-AYXX] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 55. See Scott M. Smith, Civil Jurisdiction of Magistrates Under Federal Magistrates Act 
of 1968 (28 U.S.C.A. §§ 631 et seq.), 128 A.L.R. Fed. 115 (1995). 
 56. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)–(c); see infra Parts I.B.1–2. 
 57. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. § 636(c); see infra Part I.B.2. 
 60. See infra Parts I.B.1–2. 
 61. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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1.  Jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge in Matters Referred to Them 
Without the Parties’ Consent 
The U.S. Code permits district judges to refer both case-dispositive and 
nondispositive matters to magistrate judges.62  Under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)(1)(A), magistrate judges may rule on nondispositive pretrial matters 
in civil actions and proceedings referred to them by a district judge.63  The 
parties to a lawsuit are not required to provide consent for a magistrate judge 
to rule on a nondispositive pretrial matter, and a district judge, on the 
objection of a party, must hear and set aside a magistrate judge’s ruling if it 
is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.64 
The statute explicitly prohibits magistrate judges from ruling on the 
following eight pretrial motions referred to them by a district judge because 
they are case dispositive: 
[M]otion[s] for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for 
summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made 
by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to 
permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action.65 
Under § 636(b)(1)(B), magistrate judges may file “proposed findings of 
fact and recommendations for the disposition”66 in any of the eight case-
dispositive pretrial motions carved out from § 636(b)(1)(A), motions for 
federal post-conviction relief in criminal cases, and federal habeas petitions 
referred to them by a district judge.67  For these matters, the parties have 
fourteen days to file written objections after the magistrate judge has 
submitted a report and recommendation, and the district judge must perform 
de novo review of the “portions of the report or specified proposed findings 
or recommendations to which objection is made.”68  Otherwise, the district 
judge may “accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or 
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”69  As with pretrial 
nondispositive matters, the parties’ consent is not required for a district judge 
to refer a dispositive matter to a magistrate judge to recommend a 
disposition.70 
 
 62. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)–(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). 
 63. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).  Magistrate judges may also preside over and make 
determinations in some criminal matters. See id. § 636(a); see also Dapper, supra note 4, at 3. 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). 
 65. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 
 66. Often called a “report and recommendation” or an “R & R.” 
 67. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). 
 68. Id. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). 
 69. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3); see Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 
580, 585 (2003) (noting that “the district court [is] free to do as it sees fit with the magistrate 
judge’s recommendations” in “nonconsensual referrals of pretrial but case-dispositive matters 
under § 636(b)(1)”). 
 70. See Roell, 538 U.S. at 585 (noting that § 636(b)(1) referrals are nonconsensual). 
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2.  Consent to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction in Civil Cases 
Section 636 also permits the parties in a civil case to consent to the 
jurisdiction of a magistrate judge for the entry of judgment in both jury and 
nonjury actions71: 
Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge 
or a part-time United States magistrate judge who serves as a full-time 
judicial officer may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil 
matter and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .72 
With the consent of the parties under this framework, the power to decide the 
parties’ case is transferred from a district judge to a magistrate judge.73  A 
magistrate judge effectively stands in as a district judge in a civil consent 
case74:  “[A] § 636(c)(1) referral gives the magistrate judge full authority 
over dispositive motions, conduct of trial, and entry of final judgment, all 
without district court review.”75  Further, any “judgment entered by ‘a 
magistrate judge designated to exercise civil jurisdiction under [§ 636(c)(1)]’ 
is to be treated as a final judgment of the district court”76 and is appealable 
to the circuit courts “in the same manner as an appeal from any other 
judgment of a district court.”77 
Section 636 emphasizes the importance of the voluntariness of consent to 
this framework.78  The acquisition of consent must abide by FRCP 73(b).79  
Notice of consent must be provided to the parties in writing, the parties must 
affirmatively consent in writing, and the district and magistrate judges must 
advise the parties that their consent may be freely withheld without 
repercussions for their case.80 
 
 71. This is separate from the nonconsensual referral of both pretrial dispositive and 
nondispositive matters to magistrate judges under § 636(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
 72. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 73(a) (“When authorized under 28 
U.S.C. § 636(c), a magistrate judge may, if all parties consent, conduct a civil action or 
proceeding, including a jury or nonjury trial.”). 
 73. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 74. 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 3072 (“The magistrate judge’s authority when 
presiding by special designation and with the consent of the parties is that of the district court; 
he or she therefore may perform all of the functions of a district judge.”). 
 75. Roell, 538 U.S. at 585. 
 76. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)). 
 77. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 73(c). 
 78. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (“Rules of court for the reference of civil matters to magistrate 
judges shall include procedures to protect the voluntariness of the parties’ consent.”). 
 79. FED. R. CIV. P. 73(b). 
 80. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (“[T]he district court judge or the magistrate judge . . . shall also 
advise the parties that they are free to withhold consent without adverse substantive 
consequences.”).  FRCP 73 prescribes the procedures for obtaining consent.  It requires the 
clerk of the court to give parties written notice of the opportunity to consent under § 636(c) 
and requires the parties to jointly or separately file a written statement of consent. FED. R. CIV. 
P. 73(b)(1).  The district judge or magistrate judge is informed of the parties’ response to the 
clerk’s notice of the opportunity to consent only if all parties have consented to the referral. 
Id.  The rule permits the district judge, magistrate judge, or another court official to remind 
the parties of the opportunity to consent, so long as the parties are advised that they are free to 
withhold consent without adverse consequences to their case. Id. r. 73(b)(2). 
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In addition, the Supreme Court has also held that consent to magistrate 
judge jurisdiction can be implied from the conduct of the parties during 
litigation.81  In Roell v. Withrow,82 the Supreme Court stated that the parties 
“‘clearly implied their consent’ by their decision to appear before the 
Magistrate Judge, without expressing any reservation, after being notified of 
their right to refuse and after being told that she intended to exercise case-
dispositive authority.”83  The importance of consent to jurisdiction derives, 
as discussed below, from magistrate judges’ status as Article I rather than 
Article III judges.  This is further implicated when a third party moves to 
intervene in a lawsuit, thus raising the question of whether consent is required 
for an Article I magistrate judge to rule on the motion to intervene. 
3.  Article III Judicial Power and Article I Adjudication 
Despite their importance within the federal judiciary, magistrate judges are 
not Article III judges.84  Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution vests “[t]he 
judicial Power of the United States” in “one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”85  Judges of these courts are nominated by the president with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.86  Article III, Section 1 protects the judicial 
branch as an independent and coequal branch of government by providing 
the judiciary with life tenure and protection from salary reductions.87  In 
doing so, it also protects the right of litigants to have their cases decided by 
judges free from “potential domination by other branches of government.”88 
Judges who are nominated by the president with the advice and consent of 
the Senate and whose independence is protected by lifetime tenure and salary 
protections are called Article III judges.89  These judges are empowered to 
exercise the full judicial power of the United States.90  The judicial power 
encompasses the power to order remedies for legal wrongs, make factual and 
 
 81. Roell, 538 U.S. at 582 (“The question is whether consent can be inferred from a party’s 
conduct during litigation, and we hold that it can be.”). 
 82. 538 U.S. 580 (2003). 
 83. Id. at 586 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 19a, Roell, 538 U.S. 580 (No. 
02-69)).  The parties that had been silent as to their consent filed formal letters of consent with 
the district court after the circuit court sua sponte remanded the case to the district court to 
determine whether they had consented. Id. at 583–84.  The Supreme Court noted that the 
parties “voluntarily participated in the entire course of proceedings” before a magistrate judge 
without voicing objections when the magistrate judge made it clear that she thought they had 
consented. Id. at 584. 
 84. See Dapper, supra note 4, at 3. 
 85. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 86. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 87. See id. art. III, § 1; see also James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, 
and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 646 (2004). 
 88. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (quoting 
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)). 
 89. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. III, § 1. 
 90. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. III, § 1; Pfander, supra note 87, at 651. 
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legal findings,91 and say with finality what the law is.92  Importantly, it also 
encompasses the power to render final and enforceable judgments that are 
binding between the parties in a case,93 “subject to review only by superior 
courts in the Article III hierarchy.”94 
Courts exercise the judicial power by adjudicating the matters that come 
before them.95  The judicial power extends to—and federal courts may 
adjudicate—only cases and controversies of the types listed in Article III, 
Section 2 of the Constitution.96  Article III courts are not empowered to 
provide advisory opinions.97  The judicial power is distinct from both the 
executive and legislative powers in that the judicial process is the only means 
by which an individual may be deprived of life, liberty, or property.98 
Unlike district judges, the magistrate judge’s role is authorized by 
Congress,99 magistrate judges are appointed and can be removed by the 
judges of the district court,100 and magistrate judges do not enjoy the 
protection of lifetime tenure101 or the protection against decreases in salary 
described in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.102  Because magistrate 
judges are not formally insulated by these constitutional protections, they are 
not vested with the judicial power of the United States.103  Accordingly, 
 
 91. F. Andrew Hessick, Consenting to Adjudication Outside the Article III Courts, 71 
VAND. L. REV. 715, 720–21 (2018).  Professor F. Andrew Hessick argues that parties should 
not be permitted to consent to adjudication before an Article I tribunal. Id. at 718.  This Note 
assumes the constitutionality of magistrate judge jurisdiction in civil consent cases. See infra 
note 118 and accompanying text; infra note 261. 
 92. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 93. Hessick, supra note 91, at 720–21. 
 94. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995) (finding that Congress 
cannot “retroactively command[] federal courts to reopen final judgments” and noting that 
“Article III establishes a ‘judicial department’ with the ‘province and duty . . . to say what the 
law is” (second alteration in original) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177)). 
 95. William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1520 
(2020). 
 96. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (“Article III of the 
Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to certain ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’”). 
 97. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007). 
 98. Baude, supra note 95, at 1540–42.  This concept forms part of a broader discussion 
on the distinction between private and public rights and its relation to adjudication outside 
Article III. See generally id.; Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 559 (2007); Pfander, supra note 87. 
 99. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639. 
 100. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 101. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, 
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in 
Office.”); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1938 (2015) (“Congress has 
also authorized the appointment of bankruptcy and magistrate judges, who do not enjoy the 
protections of Article III, to assist Article III courts in their work.”); Hessick, supra note 91, 
at 725; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 631(a), (e) (stating that magistrate judges are appointed by the 
judges of the district court to eight-year terms). 
 102. See Benjamin P. D. Mejia, Magistrates After Arkison & Wellness:  The Outer Limits 
of Consent, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 509, 545 n.320 (2016) (noting that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 634(b), which prohibits magistrate judge salaries from being diminished, can be repealed). 
 103. Pfander, supra note 87, at 650–51 (“Article III does not formally invest these [Article 
I] tribunals with the judicial power of the United States.”). 
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magistrate judges do not exercise independent original jurisdiction.104  
Rather, magistrate judges exercise the judicial power of the district courts,105 
qualified by the fact that magistrate judges do not have the full contempt 
authority that district judges have.106  Magistrate judges, while not a court of 
their own in the constitutional sense, are sometimes described as adjuncts of 
the Article III constitutional courts107 or as Article I judges108 because their 
role is created by statute. 
The distinction between Article I and Article III adjudication and 
adjudicators has practical implications109 because the Supreme Court has 
recognized parties’ constitutional right to “Article III’s guarantee of an 
impartial and independent federal adjudication.”110  This likely explains the 
statutory distinction between types of pretrial matters in § 636(b):  “Motions 
thought ‘dispositive’ of the action warrant particularized objection 
procedures and a higher standard of review because ‘of the possible 
constitutional objection that only an article III judge may ultimately 
 
 104. See Peter G. McCabe, A Brief History of the Federal Magistrate Judges Program, 
FED. LAW., May/June 2014, at 44, 52. 
 105. At least one scholar argues that, in civil consent cases, magistrate judges do not 
exercise any judicial power at all because judicial power is unnecessary for adjudication when 
the parties have waived their right to adjudication within Article III. See Baude, supra note 
95, at 1555–57. 
 106. Prior to the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, magistrate judges did not have 
direct authority to impose sanctions for contempt and could only certify contemptuous 
behavior to a district judge for further proceedings under § 636(e). Lee & Davis, supra note 
53, at 919.  Magistrate judges now have the authority to punish “summarily by fine or 
imprisonment, or both, . . . misbehavior of any person in the magistrate judge’s presence so as 
to obstruct the administration of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(2).  In civil consent cases, they 
also have the authority to punish in accordance with the “civil contempt authority of the district 
court” for misbehavior in their presence and can punish “disobedience or resistance to [their] 
lawful writ[s], process[es], order[s], rule[s], decree[s], or command[s]” outside their presence. 
Id. § 636(e)(3)–(4); see Lee & Davis, supra note 53, at 919.  However, the punishments 
magistrate judges may impose for contempt are limited to no more than thirty days 
imprisonment and no more than a $5000 fine, in contrast with district judges, who are not 
limited as to the fines or imprisonment they may impose. Lee & Davis, supra note 53 at 920.  
Although, magistrate judges may certify contempt to the district court in civil consent and 
misdemeanor cases where there has been “serious criminal contempt” requiring a heavier 
penalty. 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(6). 
 107. See Baude, supra note 95, at 1555 (stating that magistrate judges (1) “need not hold 
life-tenured judgeships because they do not themselves exercise any judicial power,” (2) assist 
the life-tenured Article III judges in the exercise of their judicial power, and (3) are “‘adjuncts’ 
to the real subjects of Article III”); cf. Elizabeth French, Respecting the Linchpin:  Why 
Absentee Consent Should Limit Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction, 3 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 32, 
37 (2015) (“There is . . . debate regarding whether magistrate judges are entirely Article I 
tribunals, as their pay is set by statute, or if they are adjuncts of the Article III district courts, 
as they receive their appointments from the judges in each district court.”). 
 108. See Mejia, supra note 102, at 510–11. 
 109. For example, Article I judges are prohibited from sitting by designation or presiding 
alongside Article III judges in constitutional courts. See Pfander, supra note 87, at 762 (“The 
issue arises from provisions of the Judicial Code that allow court administrators to address 
docket problems by naming judges from other federal courts to sit by designation on a 
particularly busy Article III court.”). 
 110. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1943 (2015) (quoting 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848–49 (1986)). 
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determine the litigation.’”111  However, the Supreme Court recognized in 
Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif112 that the parties’ right to 
Article III adjudication “is subject to waiver, just as are other personal 
constitutional rights . . . that dictate the procedures by which civil and 
criminal matters must be tried.”113  On this basis, the Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of bankruptcy court adjudication of “non-core 
proceedings” when the parties have knowingly and voluntarily waived their 
right to adjudication by an Article III adjudicator.114  The Supreme Court 
recognized that “[a]llowing Article I adjudicators to decide claims submitted 
to them by consent does not offend the separation of powers so long as 
Article III courts retain supervisory authority over the process”115 and that 
bankruptcy court consent jurisdiction does not involve a congressional 
attempt to transfer jurisdiction to non–Article III tribunals “‘for the purpose 
of emasculating’ constitutional courts.”116  Due to the similarities between 
bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges,117 Wellness International Network 
is thought to imply the constitutionality of magistrate judge civil consent 
jurisdiction.118 
As the Seventh Circuit has articulated, “[t]he Supreme Court has insisted 
that core judicial functions may not be given to persons who lack . . . Article 
III protections, unless all affected parties consent.”119  But once the parties 
have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction for their case, the magistrate 
judge has “all the powers which the district judge had with respect to that 
case,” qualified by the magistrate judge’s limited contempt authority.120 
 
 111. 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 3068.2 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1609, at 16 
(1976)). 
 112. 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
 113. Id. at 1943 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 
848–49 (1986)).  Article III “preserves to litigants their interest in an impartial and 
independent federal adjudication of claims . . .  [and] serves as ‘an inseparable element of the 
constitutional system of checks and balances.’” Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850–51 (1986)). 
 114. Id. at 1940, 1942. 
 115. Id. at 1944. 
 116. Id. at 1945 (quoting Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 937 (1991)). 
 117. See MCCABE, supra note 2, at 61 (noting that magistrate judges, like bankruptcy 
judges, are “non-Article III judicial officers of the Article III district courts” because 
bankruptcy judges (1) may decide with finality “core” bankruptcy matters, just as magistrate 
judges may decide nondispositive motions; (2) must file proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law for de novo review by a district judge for “non-core” bankruptcy matters, 
just as magistrate judges must file report and recommendations for dispositive motions; and 
(3) may decide “non-core” bankruptcy matters with the consent of the parties, just as 
magistrate judges may rule in civil consent cases with the consent of the parties). 
 118. 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 3071.1.  The Supreme Court in Wellness 
International Network noted that “[c]onsistent with [its] precedents, the Courts of Appeals 
have unanimously upheld the constitutionality of § 636(c).” Wellness Int’l Network, 135 S. 
Ct. at 1948 n.12 (citing cases from all thirteen circuits). 
 119. Coleman v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm’n, 860 F.3d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 739 (2018). 
 120. 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 133 (2019).  This may even include “the power to 
alter a prior ruling by the district judge, although the exercise of that power should be rare.” 
Id. 
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C.  Intervention Under FRCP 24 
Third-party intervention is one of the procedural mechanisms that 
implicates the distinction between Article I and Article III adjudication in the 
context of magistrate judge civil consent jurisdiction.  The FRCP permit 
third-party litigants to intervene in a lawsuit to represent their own 
interests.121  Potential intervenors in civil consent cases may move to 
intervene as of right122 or they may move for permissive intervention.123  
This section reviews the purpose of intervention, the differences between 
intervention as of right and permissive intervention, and details the 
appealability of a ruling on a motion to intervene. 
1.  Overview and Purpose of FRCP 24 Intervention 
Intervention is a procedural mechanism “by which an outsider with an 
interest in a lawsuit may come in as a party though the outsider has not been 
named as a party by the existing litigants.”124  Intervention seeks to balance 
the preferences of the parties (who wish to control the litigation), the 
preferences of affected absentee nonparties to be part of the litigation, and 
the public’s interest in ensuring efficient conflict resolution via the courts.125  
Courts explain the purpose of intervention is both to further judicial 
efficiency and to vindicate absentee-party interests.126  FRCP 24 sets out the 
conditions under which a federal court must allow or may permit third-party 
litigants to insert themselves in a litigation as codefendants or coplaintiffs.127 
Intervention as of right (FRCP 24(a)) requires a court to permit, on a timely 
motion, a litigant to intervene after satisfying either of two conditions:  (1) 
the potential intervenor has an unconditional right to do so under federal 
statute;128 or (2) the potential intervenor has an interest in the property or 
 
 121. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 122. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). 
 123. See id. r. 24(b). 
 124. 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 1901. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See, e.g., Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that 
the two purposes of intervention are to “foster economy of judicial administration and to 
protect non-parties from having their interests adversely affected by litigation conducted 
without their participation”); Buckner v. Schaefer, 14 F.3d 593, Nos. 93-6547, 93-6729, 93-
6846 & 93-6983, 1993 WL 542143, at *1 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (unpublished table 
decision) (permitting intervention because it was “consistent with the goals of judicial 
economy, protection of nonparties from adverse judgments entered in their absence, and 
expeditious resolution of litigation”); United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 
829, 840 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The purpose of intervention is to ‘promote[] the efficient and 
orderly use of judicial resources by allowing persons, who might otherwise have to bring a 
lawsuit on their own to protect their interests or vindicate their rights, to join an ongoing 
lawsuit instead.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th 
Cir. 1996)). 
 127. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
 128. Id. r. 24(a)(1).  An unconditional statutory right to intervene can apply in situations 
where there is a challenge to the constitutionality of an act of Congress that affects the public 
interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403 and in some equal protection cases. See 7C WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 45, § 1906. 
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transaction at issue in the action, disposing of the action without the potential 
intervenor’s participation would negatively affect the ability to protect that 
interest, and the existing parties do not adequately represent the potential 
intervenor’s interest.129  Alternatively, permissive intervention (FRCP 24(b)) 
leaves it to the court’s discretion whether to allow intervention.130  A court 
may permit intervention when the potential intervenor has a conditional right 
to intervene under federal statute131 but a court is not required to do so even 
if the party moving to intervene meets the statutory conditions.132  A court 
may also permit intervention if the potential intervenor’s claim or defense 
shares common questions of law or fact with the main action.133  In 
exercising its discretion under FRCP 24(b), a court must consider whether 
intervention would “delay or prejudice the adjudication” of the main 
action.134  The court’s discretion applies regardless of the stated reason for 
intervention under FRCP 24(b).135 
Intervention as of right and permissive intervention differ in a number of 
respects.  Importantly, intervention as of right poses questions of law, 
whereas permissive intervention is at the discretion of the court136 and looks 
principally to “whether the intervention [would] unduly delay or prejudice 
the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.”137  They also differ in the 
standard of review on appeal138—intervention as of right is reviewed under 
the clear error standard, whereas permissive intervention is reviewed under 
the abuse of discretion standard.139  The next section discusses the 
appealability of motions to intervene. 
2.  Appealability and the Dispositive Nature of Intervention 
Rulings on both motions to intervene as of right and on permissive 
intervention may be appealed.140  However, the grant of a motion to intervene 
is not immediately appealable and can only be challenged on appeal after 
final judgment has been entered in the case141 because an order granting 
intervention is not in itself a final judgment.142  The denial of a motion to 
 
 129. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
 130. See Id. r. 24(b). 
 131. Id. r. 24(b)(1). 
 132. 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 1910.  Some provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 allow a court to permit the U.S. attorney general to intervene in a civil action if he 
certifies, upon timely motion, that the case is of general public importance. Id. (citing 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(a), 2000e-5(f)(1)). 
 133. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B). 
 134. Id. r. 24(b)(3). 
 135. 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 1913. 
 136. Id. § 1902. 
 137. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(3); 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 1913. 
 138. 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 1913. 
 139. Id. § 1923. 
 140. Id. § 1902. 
 141. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 375–77 (1987) 
(holding that challenges to an order granting permissive intervention but denying intervention 
as of right were not immediately appealable and could be raised only after judgment). 
 142. 15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 3914.18. 
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intervene, on the other hand, is generally immediately appealable,143 but 
courts differ on how they treat the disposition as a formal matter.144  Some 
appeals courts reverse the denial of a motion to intervene if they find that the 
trial court incorrectly denied the motion.145  If these courts find that the trial 
court correctly denied a motion to intervene, they instead dismiss the 
potential intervenor’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.146  Courts that reverse 
the denial of a motion to intervene hold as a formal matter that jurisdiction 
to review the denial of a motion to intervene turns to some extent on the 
merits of the motion for both intervention as of right and permissive 
intervention.147  Other circuit courts affirm a trial court’s denial of a potential 
intervenor’s motion to intervene rather than dismissing it for lack of 
jurisdiction.148  These courts treat the denial of a motion to intervene as a 
final judgment for the purposes of appeal.149 
Nonetheless, circuit court review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to 
intervene necessarily involves some evaluation of the motion on its merits.150  
And both dismissal and affirmance of a denial have the same practical effect 
of denying the potential intervenor participation in the litigation with the 
same status as the original parties.151  The distinctions and practical 
similarities in appellate review of the denial of a motion to intervene as of 
right are also seen in permissive intervention.152  Additionally, while noting 
that a motion to intervene is final for the purposes of appeal, some courts 
have recognized that the motion, overall, is nondispositive, as it does not 
result in a final disposition of the case itself.153  Whether intervention is 
 
 143. 7C id. § 1923. 
 144. 15B id. § 3914.18 (“[S]ome courts have come to the view that final judgment appeal 
is available from orders denying either intervention as a matter of right or permissive 
intervention, [while] others continue to adhere to one or another of the older views.”). 
 145. 7C id. § 1923. 
 146. Id.  In this posture, a circuit court would order dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 
because the potential intervenor was correctly determined not to have been a party, and thus 
the circuit court would not have jurisdiction to hear the potential intervenor’s appeal, as they 
are a nonparty. Id.  Courts following this formal distinction reach the merits of the potential 
intervenor’s motion to intervene. See id. 
 147. See Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 992 (5th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. E. 
Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 635, 637 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 148. 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 1923. 
 149. See United States v. Geranis, 808 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 2015); R & G Mortg. Corp. 
v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 584 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2009); Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. 
Forest Serv., 573 F.3d 992, 994 (10th Cir. 2009); Alt. Rsch. & Dev. Found. v. Veneman, 262 
F.3d 406, 409 (D.C. Cir. 2001); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 
1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997); Dev. Fin. Corp. v. Alpha Hous. & Health Care, Inc., 54 F.3d 156, 
158 (3d Cir. 1995); Shea v. Angulo, 19 F.3d 343, 344–45 (7th Cir. 1994); SEC v. Everest 
Mgmt. Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1238 n.2 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 150. 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 1923. 
 151. See id. §§ 1902, 1920. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Coleman v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm’n, 860 F.3d 461, 474 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(recognizing that a magistrate judge can rule on motions to intervene because those motions 
are nondispositive), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 739 (2018).  In contrast, for example, a motion for 
leave to proceed in forma pauperis is typically found to be dispositive because denial of that 
motion is the “functional equivalent” of involuntary dismissal:  an indigent party seeking to 
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dispositive is important to magistrate judges’ authority to rule on intervention 
under § 636154 and the framework’s relationship to parties’ right to 
adjudication before an Article III adjudicator.155 
II.  WHETHER A MAGISTRATE JUDGE MAY RULE ON MOTIONS TO 
INTERVENE IN CIVIL CONSENT CASES 
Some circuits disagree on whether a magistrate judge can rule on a motion 
to intervene in a civil consent case without the consent of the potential 
intervenor.156  In 1993, the Second Circuit in New York Chinese V, drawing 
on the importance of consent to the constitutionality of magistrate judge civil 
consent jurisdiction,157 determined that a magistrate judge cannot rule on a 
motion to intervene when the potential intervenor has not consented and 
objects to magistrate judge jurisdiction.158  The Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
have both held the opposite.159  In 1999, the Seventh Circuit held in People 
Who Care that a magistrate judge may rule on a potential intervenor’s motion 
to intervene without consent because the potential intervenor is not a party to 
the litigation.160  Then, in 2016, the Ninth Circuit in Robert Ito Farm also 
adopted this reasoning when confronted with the same question.161 
The circuit courts are thus divided between those that permit a magistrate 
judge to rule on a potential intervenor’s motion to intervene in a civil consent 
case without the intervenor’s consent and those that do not.  To be clear, the 
circuit courts discussed in this Note, and other circuit courts as well, are 
aligned in holding that an intervenor, upon entering the case as a late-coming 
party, must consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction if the motion to intervene 
is granted.162  Specifically, the circuit courts differ as to when that consent is 
 
proceed in forma pauperis cannot proceed in the litigation, as a practical matter, if the court 
denies exemption from court filing fees.  Thus, courts have held that a magistrate judge cannot 
rule on a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without the consent of the parties. See, 
e.g., Hunter v. Roventini, 617 F. App’x 225, 226 (4th Cir. 2015); Lister v. Dep’t of Treasury, 
408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005); Donaldson v. Ducote, 373 F.3d 622, 623–25 (5th Cir. 
2004); Woods v. Dahlberg, 894 F.2d 187, 187 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 154. See supra Parts I.B.1–2. 
 155. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 156. See French, supra note 107, at 52 (noting that there is “uncertainty as to whether 
magistrates or Article III judges have the jurisdiction to decide a motion to intervene when the 
movant has not consented to magistrate authority”). 
 157. See infra notes 181–82 and accompanying text. 
 158. See infra Part II.A. 
 159. See infra Part II.B. 
 160. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 161. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 162. See, e.g., Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. County of Maui, 842 F.3d 681, 687 (9th Cir. 2016); 
Day v. Persels & Assocs., 729 F.3d 1309, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that the Eleventh 
Circuit had not yet decided whether late-coming parties must consent after joining a litigation 
but acknowledging that the prevailing rule of the federal courts requires late-comer consent); 
Williams v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 268 (7th Cir. 1998); New York 
Chinese V, 996 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1993); Caprera v. Jacobs, 790 F.2d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 
1986) (holding that the magistrate judge lacked authority to enter final judgment in a case 
where named parties consented to magistrate jurisdiction and then amended the complaint to 
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required:  the Second Circuit requires a potential intervenor’s consent to 
magistrate judge jurisdiction upon filing a motion seeking leave to 
intervene,163 whereas the Seventh and Ninth Circuits do not require the 
consent of the intervenor until the motion seeking leave to intervene has been 
granted and the intervenor has become a party to the lawsuit.164  Thus, this 
Note concerns who can rule on a motion permitting a potential intervenor to 
become an intervenor in a civil consent case.  To this end, Part II.A analyzes 
the Second Circuit’s jurisprudence, which prohibits a magistrate judge from 
ruling on a motion to intervene when the potential intervenor has not 
consented and objects to magistrate judge jurisdiction.  Part II.B then 
evaluates the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ jurisprudence, which permits a 
magistrate judge to rule on a potential intervenor’s motion to intervene 
without consent. 
A.  The Second Circuit in New York Chinese V 
In 1993, the Second Circuit held in New York Chinese V that the 
importance of consent to the constitutionality of magistrate judge civil 
consent jurisdiction requires that the potential intervenors consent for a 
magistrate judge to rule on the motion to intervene.165  Thus, the district 
judge must rule on a motion to intervene when the original parties have 
consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) but 
the potential intervenors have not.166 
New York Chinese V was decided as part of a series of appeals and remands 
in a copyright infringement case brought by Chinese-language television 
program importers.167  In this case, the original parties consented to the 
jurisdiction of a magistrate judge, who ruled in favor of the plaintiff, New 
York Chinese TV Programs, Inc. (“Chinese TV Programs”), during the 
liability phase of the litigation.168  Before the case proceeded to trial to 
determine damages, three Chinese TV Programs shareholders (the potential 
intervenors in this case) sold their combined, controlling interest in Chinese 
TV Programs but retained the right to share in any damages awarded in the 
lawsuit.169  Chinese TV Programs, no longer under the potential intervenors’ 
control, then settled the case against the potential intervenors’ wishes.170  The 
potential intervenors moved to intervene as of right in the lawsuit to 
 
add defendants).  If they do not consent, the case is transferred back to the district judge. See, 
e.g., Robert Ito Farm, 842 F.3d at 685 n.2. 
 163. See infra Part II.A. 
 164. See infra Part II.B. 
 165. New York Chinese V, 996 F.2d at 23–24. 
 166. Id. 
 167. New York Chinese V, 996 F.2d at 22. 
 168. Id. 
 169. The court noted that these shareholders sought to use this money to pay off their 
investment in financing the litigation. See id. 
 170. See id. at 22–23 (noting that the settlement amount was for less than the amount of 
damages and attorneys’ fees). 
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challenge the settlement,171 first in the Second Circuit, which denied their 
motion because it was not properly before the court,172 and again in the 
district court, which, over their objections, referred the motion to a magistrate 
judge,173 who denied it as untimely.174  Treating the magistrate judge’s ruling 
as a report and recommendation to the district judge, the potential intervenors 
then appealed to the district court and sought de novo review of their motion 
to intervene.175  The district court dismissed the appeal, finding that it lacked 
jurisdiction because the original parties had consented to magistrate judge 
jurisdiction for all proceedings in the case.176  Thus, the potential intervenors 
appealed to the Second Circuit.177 
On appeal, the potential intervenors again argued that the earlier consent 
of the original parties did not bind them.178  They asserted that, because their 
motion was referred to the magistrate judge over their objections and without 
their consent, the district judge was required to rule on their motion to 
intervene, rather than the magistrate judge.179  The potential intervenors 
further argued that the magistrate judge’s order carried no more weight than 
a report and recommendation, warranting de novo review by a district 
court.180 
The Second Circuit agreed with the potential intervenors, emphasizing the 
importance of consent to the validity of magistrate judge jurisdiction in civil 
consent cases and resting its holding on the fact that consent to magistrate 
judge jurisdiction must be “truly voluntary.”181  The Second Circuit believed 
this was evidenced because:  (1) both notice of the availability of magistrate 
judge jurisdiction and consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction must be in 
writing, (2) consent must be clearly and expressly given and cannot be 
implied from the conduct of the parties, and (3) the voluntariness of consent 
is prescribed and protected both by statute and through the FRCP.182  The 
Second Circuit thus held that “[w]ithout the consent of the ‘intervenors’, the 
magistrate judge’s order has the effect only of a report and recommendation 
to the district judge, who upon the filing of objections must review de novo 
 
 171. New York Chinese VI, 153 F.R.D. 69, 70 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 43 F.3d 1458 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
 172. New York Chinese V, 996 F.2d at 23.  The potential intervenors sought permission to 
intervene in the case from the Second Circuit, as, at the time, the case was on appeal in the 
Second Circuit. Id.  Generally, nonparties can petition a circuit court for leave to intervene in 
an appeal. See 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 3902.1. 
 173. New York Chinese V, 996 F.2d at 23. 
 174. New York Chinese VI, 153 F.R.D. at 72. 
 175. New York Chinese V, 996 F.2d at 23. 
 176. Id. 
 177. The parties did not consent to appeal to the district court. See id.; see also supra note 
49 and accompanying text. 
 178. New York Chinese V, 996 F.2d at 23. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 23–24. 
 182. Id. at 24.  This decision occurred before the Supreme Court permitted inferred consent 
to magistrate judge jurisdiction in Roell. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also 
supra Part I.B.2. 
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the recommendation,”183 rather than the effect of an order appealable to a 
circuit court and subject to more deferential review.184  The Second Circuit 
subsequently recognized the validity of this holding in Stackhouse v. 
McKnight185 in 2006 and in In re McCray, Richardson, Santana, Wise & 
Salaam Litigation186 in 2016.187 
B.  The Seventh Circuit in People Who Care and the Ninth Circuit in Robert 
Ito Farm 
By contrast, two circuit courts have held that a magistrate judge does not 
need the consent of a potential intervenor to rule on the motion to 
intervene.188  In 1999, the Seventh Circuit held in People Who Care189 that, 
because a potential intervenor is not a party, a magistrate judge in a civil 
consent case does not need consent to rule on a motion to intervene.190  The 
Ninth Circuit in Robert Ito Farm191 also adopted this reasoning in 2016.192 
1.  People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education, School District No. 
205 
People Who Care was a long-running public school district desegregation 
case from Rockford, Illinois.193  The parties consented to magistrate judge 
jurisdiction for the remedial phase of the litigation after the district court 
found that the school district had intentionally discriminated against Black 
and Hispanic students, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
 
 183. New York Chinese V, 996 F.2d at 25.  The Second Circuit also recognized that the 
potential intervenors were not parties to the lawsuit. Id. at 24 (“Simply put, Doo, Mu, and 
Cheng were not parties to the action when the original consents to referral were executed and 
they have not yet, themselves, consented to exercise of plenary jurisdiction by the magistrate 
judge.”). 
 184. See supra Part I.B.1 (noting that a report and recommendation on a dispositive motion 
from a magistrate judge to a district judge receives less deferential, de novo review); see also 
Part I.C.1 (noting that circuit courts review a trial court order on a motion to intervene under 
the deferential standards of either clear error or abuse of discretion). 
 185. 168 F. App’x 464 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that a district judge must rule on a potential 
intervenor’s motion to intervene in a civil consent case when the potential intervenor has not 
consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction). 
 186. 832 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating that potential intervenors must also consent to 
magistrate judge jurisdiction). 
 187. The Eleventh Circuit observed in passing that at least some district courts in its circuit 
have followed the reasoning of the Second Circuit in New York Chinese V. See Day v. Persels 
& Assocs., 729 F.3d 1309, 1322 (11th Cir. 2013) (first citing Newman v. Sun Cap., Inc., No. 
09-cv-445-FtM-29, 2010 WL 326069 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2010); and then citing Smith v. 
Powder Mountain, LLC, Nos. 08-80820-civ & 08-cv-81185, 2010 WL 5483327 (S.D. Fla. 
Dec. 8, 2010)); see also Carr v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 13-cv-732, 2013 WL 
12383150, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2013). 
 188. See infra Parts II.B.1–2. 
 189. 171 F.3d 1083, 1089 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 190. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 191. 842 F.3d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 192. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 193. People Who Care, 171 F.3d at 1085. 
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Fourteenth Amendment.194  The magistrate judge, aided by a special master, 
entered an extensive equitable decree to remedy the school district’s past 
discrimination.195  The special master submitted proposed budgets to fund 
the decree for two fiscal years, and the magistrate judge entered budget orders 
after making a few reductions—but fewer than the school board wanted.196 
The school board had three new members who had run on a platform 
opposing the use of the school district’s tort immunity fund to fund 
compliance with the decree.197  This “new” board voted against instituting a 
levy to fund compliance with the decree.198  As a result, the magistrate judge 
ordered the board to vote in favor of the levy.199  After the board unanimously 
voted to approve the levy in compliance with the magistrate judge’s order, 
three board members moved to intervene in the litigation to challenge the 
magistrate judge’s order.200  They asserted that the magistrate judge’s order 
required them to “vote against their consciences” and thus injured them by 
turning them into “dissembling politician[s] in the minds of [their] 
constituents.”201  The potential intervenors objected to the magistrate judge’s 
jurisdiction to decide their motion to intervene.202  The magistrate judge then 
denied the potential intervenors’ motion as untimely203 and because the 
potential intervenors lacked a legally cognizable interest and Article III 
standing.204 
On appeal, the potential intervenors argued that, because they had not 
consented to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction, the magistrate judge did not 
have authority to rule on their motion to intervene.205  The Seventh Circuit 
rejected their argument and held that a magistrate judge can rule on a 
potential intervenor’s motion without consent.206  The court noted that 
requiring the consent of potential intervenors for a magistrate judge to rule 
on their motion would unduly erode the power of a magistrate judge to enter 
binding judgments in civil consent cases.207  The court further noted that 
requiring a district judge to rule on intervention in civil consent cases would 
cause “delay, confusion, duplication of effort, the possibility of inconsistent 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1086. 
 197. Id. at 1088. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 1088–89. 
 200. Id. at 1089. 
 201. Id. 
 202. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 179 F.R.D. 551, 559 
(N.D. Ill. 1998), aff’d, 171 F.3d 1083 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 203. Id. at 560. 
 204. Id. at 560–63.  The magistrate judge observed that the potential intervenors were 
attempting, in their individual capacities, to appeal his order to approve the levy after the 
school board voted against bringing an appeal. Id. at 561–63. 
 205. People Who Care, 171 F.3d at 1089.  The potential intervenors also argued that they 
had suffered a sufficient injury in fact to confer standing under Article III to challenge the 
magistrate judge’s order. See id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
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determinations, and a drain on judicial resources.”208  The Seventh Circuit 
observed that the “power to rule on motions to intervene is a necessary and 
proper incident of the magistrate judge’s power to decide the underlying 
case” in civil consent cases.209  Finally, the court noted that the text of 
§ 636(c)(1) requires only the consent of the “parties” for a magistrate judge 
to exercise jurisdiction and that it does not “bend” far enough to require the 
consent of potential intervenors.210  The court concluded that a potential 
intervenor is not a “party” but rather a litigant that wishes to become a party 
in civil consent cases.211  The Seventh Circuit later recognized the validity 
of People Who Care’s holding in 2017 in Coleman v. Labor & Industrial 
Review Commission.212 
2.  Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. County of Maui 
Like the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit held in Robert Ito Farm that a 
magistrate judge can rule on a motion to intervene when the original parties 
have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction but the potential intervenor 
has not.213  Specifically, after all the original parties had consented to 
magistrate judge jurisdiction, Moms on a Mission Hui (“MOM Hui”) and 
Shaka Movement moved to intervene in a lawsuit brought by industrial 
agriculture plaintiffs challenging a county ordinance that prohibited the 
“growth, testing, and cultivation of genetically engineered crops until the 
County [of Maui] conducted an environmental and health impact study.”214  
The magistrate judge granted Shaka Movement’s motion to intervene but 
denied MOM Hui’s.215  MOM Hui then appealed the magistrate judge’s 
denial of its motion to the district court, which ordered supplemental briefing 
on the issue.216  The district judge then held that the magistrate judge had 
 
 208. Id.  “The only effect of allowing [the potential intervenors] into the case would be to 
slow it down, which is the opposite of what the board wants or should want.” Id. at 1090. 
 209. Id. at 1089. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. 860 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 739 (2018). 
 213. Roberto Ito Farm, Inc. v. County of Maui, 842 F.3d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We 
hold that prospective intervenors are not ‘parties’ for purposes of § 636(c)(1), and a magistrate 
judge who has the consent of the named parties to the suit may rule on a prospective 
intervenor’s motion to intervene without the prospective intervenor’s consent.”). 
 214. Id. at 684.   
 215. The magistrate judge found that both Shaka Movement’s and MOM Hui’s motions 
were timely, identified “significantly protectable interests” that would be impaired if the 
county ordinance was invalidated, and that the County of Maui would not adequately represent 
their interests. Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. County of Maui, No. 14-00511, 2014 WL 7148741, at 
*3–6 (D. Haw. Dec. 15, 2014).  However, Shaka Movement had been involved in the ballot 
initiative that enacted the ordinance while MOM Hui had not. Id.  Thus, the magistrate judge 
reasoned that Shaka Movement would adequately represent MOM Hui’s interests. Id. 
 216. Docket Order, Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. County of Maui, No. 14-00511, 2015 WL 
134070 (D. Haw. Jan. 9, 2015), ECF No. 75 (“Proposed Intervenor cites no authority for the 
proposition that, with the reassignment of the case to a District Judge, rulings made by [the 
Magistrate Judge] when he was the judge presiding over the case somehow are transformed 
into rulings appealable to a District Judge.  The court invites Proposed Intervenor to submit 
authority to this effect . . . .”). 
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jurisdiction to rule on MOM Hui’s motion to intervene because the original 
parties to the suit had consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction.217 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit focused its analysis on whether potential 
intervenors are “parties” to the lawsuit in which they seek to intervene and 
thus whether a magistrate judge needs their consent to decide their motion to 
intervene in a civil consent case.218  The Ninth Circuit drew on the Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis in People Who Care and relied on Supreme Court 
precedent in United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York219 defining 
“party” in the context of federal litigation as “one by or against whom a 
lawsuit is brought.”220  From this, the Ninth Circuit held that a “prospective 
intervenor is not a ‘party’ as that term is used in § 636(c)(1)” because the 
intervenor does not become a party until the motion is granted and the 
intervenor is permitted to enter the litigation.221  Thus, because potential 
intervenors are not parties within the litigation context—and so are not 
parties within the meaning of § 636(c)—the court held that a magistrate judge 
does not need their consent to decide their motions to intervene.222 
III.  GRANTING MAGISTRATE JUDGES THE AUTHORITY TO RULE ON 
MOTIONS TO INTERVENE IN CIVIL CONSENT CASES  
This part argues that the circuit split between the Second Circuit and the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits223 should be resolved by permitting magistrate 
judges to rule on a potential intervenor’s motion to intervene in civil consent 
cases when only the original parties to the lawsuit have consented.  Part III.A 
argues that this resolution is consistent with the text and structure of § 636.  
Part III.B then evaluates the Second Circuit’s constitutional counterargument 
against permitting magistrate judges to rule on a potential intervenor’s 
motion to intervene without consent and observes that this resolution does 
not infringe on a litigant’s constitutional right to adjudication before an 
Article III judge.  Finally, Part III.C discusses how the implications of this 
resolution promote fairness and the expedient disposition of cases, while 
 
 217. Robert Ito Farm, 842 F.3d at 685 (“The district court further held that any appeal from 
the magistrate judge’s order needed to be taken to the Ninth Circuit because the magistrate 
judge, having obtained the consent of the parties, had authority to enter a final decision under 
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).”). 
 218. Id. at 687. 
 219. 556 U.S. 928 (2009). 
 220. Robert Ito Farm, 842 F.3d at 688 (“‘Party’ therefore means the same thing in 
§ 636(c)(3) as ‘parties’ does in § 636(c)(1):  ‘[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is brought.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 933)). 
 221. Id. at 687.  The Ninth Circuit also noted that “[w]hile later-added parties must give 
consent for a magistrate judge to exercise jurisdiction, prospective parties do not have the 
same right.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 222. MOM Hui also argued that, if it was not a party, it would not have had a right to appeal 
any decision of a magistrate judge denying a motion to intervene. Id. at 687.  The Ninth Circuit 
noted that MOM Hui did have a right to appeal the order denying its motion to intervene under 
the collateral order doctrine rather than based on its status as a party to the litigation. Id. at 
687–88. 
 223. See supra Part II.A–B. 
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avoiding litigation gamesmanship and disincentivizing consent to magistrate 
judge jurisdiction. 
A.  There Is No Statutory Bar on Magistrate Judges Ruling on Motions to 
Intervene 
This section argues, consistent with Seventh and Ninth Circuit precedent, 
that § 636 is a broad authorization of magistrate judge power over civil 
consent cases.  The text and structure of § 636 demonstrate that it is within a 
magistrate judge’s statutory authority to rule on potential intervenors’ 
motions to intervene in civil consent cases without their consent.  This section 
further argues that § 636 implies that magistrate judge rulings are to be 
treated with the same deference as district judge rulings and that the Second 
Circuit precedent fails to do so. 
1.  Section 636 Authorizes the Broad Exercise of Magistrate Judge Control 
over the Original Parties’ Case 
First, potential intervenors are not “parties” within the meaning of § 636.  
The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits all recognize that potential 
intervenors are not parties to the litigation in which they seek to intervene.224  
The Second Circuit recognized the nonparty status of the potential 
intervenors in New York Chinese V but did not afford this status the same 
weight as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits,225 which relied on the nonparty 
status of the potential intervenors within the meaning of § 636 in their 
analyses.226  Within the statutory framework of § 636, the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits take the more compelling approach.  Magistrate judges derive their 
authority in civil consent cases from the consent of the parties to an action,227 
who, in providing their consent, waive their constitutional right to 
adjudication before an Article III adjudicator.228  However, the term “parties” 
is not defined in the FMA.229  As the Ninth Circuit noted in Robert Ito Farm, 
the Supreme Court defines a “party” to litigation as “one by or against whom 
a lawsuit is brought”230 and has stated that intervention is a mechanism by 
which a nonparty is allowed to become a party.231  Using this definition, 
potential intervenors are not a parties whose consent is required within the 
framework of § 636(c) because they are not bringing the lawsuit and the 
lawsuit is not brought against them—they seek to become parties in existing 
lawsuits. 
 
 224. See supra notes 183, 213 and accompanying text; supra Part II.B.1. 
 225. See New York Chinese V, 996 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 226. See supra Part II.B. 
 227. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 
 228. See supra Parts I.B.2–3. 
 229. See 28 U.S.C. § 639. 
 230. United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 931, 933 (2009) 
(quoting Party, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)) (holding that the United States “is 
not a ‘party’ to an FCA action for purposes of the appellate filing deadline unless it has 
exercised its right to intervene in the case”). 
 231. Id. 
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Black’s Law Dictionary additionally defines “party” as “anyone who both 
is directly interested in a lawsuit and has a right to control the proceedings, 
make a defense, or appeal from an adverse judgment.”232  A potential 
intervenor is a litigant who claims to be “directly interested in a lawsuit” but 
who does not have a “right to control the proceedings” and thus has no right 
to “make a defense,” as the potential intervenor has not yet been permitted to 
participate in the litigation.233  Deciding a motion to intervene necessarily 
involves evaluating whether a potential intervenor has an interest in the 
litigation,234 so it follows that denial of that motion indicates the lack of a 
right to participate because a court has determined that there is no interest.  
Potential intervenors can “appeal from an adverse judgment,”235 but they are 
only parties to the appeals from denial of their motions—not parties to the 
underlying actions—as they have not yet been permitted to join in any claims 
or defenses in the underlying suits or assert their own claims or defenses.  
Thus, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits aptly describe potential intervenors as 
litigants seeking to become parties, rather than as parties to a suit, whose 
consent is required for the magistrate judge to rule on their motion. 
Further, § 636(c) authorizes magistrate judges to conduct, “[u]pon the 
consent of the parties . . . any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil 
matter and order the entry of judgment in the case.”236  This is a broad grant 
of authority over civil consent cases that by its ordinary meaning should 
necessarily encompass the authority to rule on a third-party’s motion to 
intervene.  And, because magistrate judge control over a civil consent case is 
the same as a district judge’s,237 it (1) dilutes § 636’s broad grant of full 
magistrate judge control over civil consent cases, (2) treats magistrate judge 
control over civil consent cases as less extensive than district judge control 
in normal cases, and (3) thus is inconsistent with the text of § 636 if a 
magistrate judge has authority to enter final judgment in a case but does not 
have authority to rule on certain interlocutory decisions in that case.  From 
§ 636’s broad grant of authority, the Seventh Circuit aptly observes that the 
“power to rule on motions to intervene is a necessary and proper incident of 
the magistrate judge’s power to decide the underlying [civil consent] 
case.”238 
 
 232. Party, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 233. Id.   
 234. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 235. Party, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 
304 (1988) (per curiam) (noting that “denials of [motions to intervene] are, of course, 
appealable”); see also supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 236. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
 237. See supra note 74 and accompanying text; supra Part I.B.2.  Notwithstanding this, 
there are differences in magistrate judge contempt authority, as noted above. See supra note 
106 and accompanying text; supra Part I.B.3. 
 238. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 171 F.3d 1083, 1089 
(7th Cir. 1999). 
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2.  Section 636 Implies Uniformity of Treatment for Motions to Intervene 
Second, § 636(c) favors permitting magistrate judges to rule on motions to 
intervene in civil consent cases without the consent of the potential 
intervenors because the section implies that these motions are to be treated 
uniformly.  The Second Circuit’s precedent creates a structural inconsistency 
within § 636 regarding the treatment of a potential intervenor’s motion to 
intervene that does not exist under the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ precedent.  
While the Second Circuit did not explicitly say as much,239 it treats a motion 
to intervene as dispositive in a civil consent case under § 636(c).  The Second 
Circuit requires magistrate judges to obtain the consent of the potential 
intervenors to decide the motion.240  If potential intervenors do not consent 
to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction, they can object to the ruling and obtain 
de novo review by a district judge241:  this is the same treatment that a 
dispositive motion receives under § 636(b)(1)(B).242  However, a motion to 
intervene, if referred to a magistrate judge under § 636(b), is otherwise 
treated as nondispositive by courts in the Second Circuit243 and is reviewed 
only for clear error by a district judge.244  As noted by the district court in 
Robert Ito Farm, this distinction in the dispositive nature of the motion to 
intervene within § 636 affords less deference to a magistrate judge ruling on 
a motion to intervene under § 636(c)245—when they have all the power a 
district judge would to preside over the parties’ case246—than a magistrate 
judge ruling on a motion to intervene referred to them under § 636(b).247  
Further, whether a motion is dispositive or nondispositive does not turn on 
who decides the motion; rather, it turns on whether deciding the motion 
involves an evaluation of the merits or fully disposes of a particular claim or 
the case as a whole.248  Under this definition, intervention is not a dispositive 
 
 239. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950, 2016 WL 11645644, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2016) (“[T]he Second Circuit did not make an explicit determination in 
New York Chinese as to whether a motion to intervene is dispositive . . . .”). 
 240. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 
 242. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); supra Part I.B.2. 
 243. See, e.g., Rosado v. Pruitt, No. 17-CV-4843, 2018 WL 262835, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 2, 2018), appeal filed, No. 20-3188 (2d Cir. Sept. 18, 2020); Chen-Oster, 2016 WL 
11645644, at *2; Lopez v. Bell Sports, Inc., No. 14-cv-2530, 2014 WL 6473533, at *1 n.1 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2014); Grewal v. Cuneo, No. 13 Civ. 6836, 2014 WL 2095166, at *1 n.1 
(S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2014); Int’l Chem. Corp. v. Nautilus Ins. Co., No. 09-CV-359S, 2010 WL 
3070101, at *1 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2010).  But see, e.g., Madison Stock Transfer, Inc. v. 
Marine Expl., Inc., No. 15-cv-6394, 2017 WL 383351, at *1 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2017); 
Medina v. Fischer, No. 11 Civ. 0176, 2013 WL 1294621, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013) 
(finding a motion to intervene as of right to be dispositive). 
 244. See 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 3068.1 (noting that motions to intervene are 
pretrial matters under § 636(b)(1)(A), which do not warrant de novo review by a district 
judge); supra Part I.B.1. 
 245. See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. County of Maui, No. 14-00511, 2015 WL 134070, at *2 
(D. Haw. Jan. 9, 2015). 
 246. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 248. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72 (distinguishing between pretrial matters “not dispositive of a 
party’s claim or defense” (FRCP 72(a)) and “pretrial matters dispositive of a claim or defense” 
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motion249:  deciding a motion to intervene, while it requires a magistrate 
judge to evaluate the potential intervenor’s interest in the underlying 
substantive claims or defenses of the case, does not require a magistrate judge 
to evaluate the merits or dispose of any of the underlying substantive claims 
or defenses in the case.250  The Seventh and Ninth Circuits correctly treat a 
motion to intervene as nondispositive within § 636 and thus avoid the 
inconsistency created by the Second Circuit. 
Further, § 636 implies that a magistrate judge’s ruling on a motion to 
intervene must be treated with the same deference as a district judge’s ruling.  
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits afford a magistrate judge this equal 
treatment, whereas the Second Circuit fails to do so.251  As the Supreme 
Court stated in Roell, “a § 636(c)(1) referral gives the magistrate judge full 
authority over dispositive motions, conduct of trial, and entry of final 
judgment, all without district court review.”252  Judgments entered by a 
magistrate judge are treated as judgments of the district courts, and § 636 was 
amended such that appeals from a magistrate judge’s orders in a civil consent 
case are now taken directly to the circuit courts like any other judgment of 
the district courts.253  Because magistrate judges have full authority over the 
matters that come before them in civil consent cases and their orders are 
appealable in the same manner as the orders of a district court judge, a 
magistrate judge’s ruling on a motion to intervene in a civil consent case 
should not be afforded less deference than a district judge’s on the same 
motion.  For a motion to intervene, a district judge’s ruling does not receive 
de novo review by another district judge upon the objection of a potential 
intervenor in the Second, Seventh, or Ninth Circuits.254  In the Seventh and 
Ninth Circuits, neither does a magistrate judge’s ruling on a motion to 
intervene in a civil consent case receive such de novo review.255  However, 
by requiring a district court to review de novo a magistrate judge’s ruling 
 
(FRCP 72(b))); 12C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 3068.2 (noting that a district court found 
a motion to proceed in forma pauperis dispositive because it “necessarily involved an analysis 
of the merits of plaintiff’s claim”); see also Motion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019) (defining a dispositive motion as:  “[a] motion for a trial-court order to decide a claim 
or case in favor of the movant without further proceedings; specif[ically], a motion that, if 
granted, results in a judgment on the case as a whole, as with a motion for summary judgment 
or a motion to dismiss”). 
 249. See id.; supra Part I.C.2. 
 250. See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 4438. 
 251. See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. County of Maui, No. 14-0511, 2015 WL 134070, at *3 
(D. Haw. Jan. 9, 2015) (“[T]he Second Circuit diminishes the ability of a magistrate judge to 
manage a case that the parties have agreed the magistrate judge may manage.”), 842 F.3d 681 
(9th Cir. 2016). 
 252. Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 585 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 253. See supra Part I.B.2; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 73(C); supra notes 76–77 and 
accompanying text.  Section 636 previously allowed the parties in a civil consent case to 
consent to have appeals from the orders of a magistrate judge taken to the district court rather 
than to a court of appeals, but this path of appeal was removed in 1996. See supra note 49 and 
accompanying text.  Appealing to the district court was not the default path, though. See supra 
note 49 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 255. See supra Parts II.B.1–2. 
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upon the objections of potential intervenors,256 the Second Circuit approach 
inherently treats a magistrate judge’s ruling on a motion to intervene with 
less deference than a district judge’s order, which would not be subject to 
this level of scrutiny. 
The Second Circuit’s approach also, in theory, permits two opportunities 
to appeal a magistrate judge’s ruling on a motion to intervene in a civil 
consent case but only one opportunity to appeal a district judge’s ruling on a 
motion to intervene.257  And, in the Second Circuit, a district judge’s ruling 
on a motion to intervene is reviewed on appeal under either the deferential 
clear error or abuse of discretion standard.258  A magistrate judge’s ruling on 
a motion to intervene in a civil consent case, however, is evaluated under the 
less deferential de novo standard of review upon objection.259  By contrast, 
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ approach allows for one opportunity to 
appeal from magistrate judge rulings in civil consent cases—the same as for 
district judge rulings.260 
If a magistrate judge’s ruling on a motion to intervene in a civil consent 
case is to be treated with the same deference as a district judge’s ruling on a 
motion to intervene, it then follows that a magistrate judge’s ruling should be 
reviewed under the same standard of review as a district judge’s ruling, rather 
than the de novo standard by a district judge.  It also follows that a magistrate 
judge’s order should not be afforded the additional opportunity for review 
that the Second Circuit’s rule creates, as that opportunity is not available for 
motions to intervene decided by a district judge.  Accordingly, the Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits’ precedent best honors the uniformity of treatment 
magistrate judge orders are supposed to receive.  It also avoids creating 
inconsistencies that the Second Circuit’s precedent creates and treats 
magistrate judge and district judge rulings on motions to intervene with the 
same deference.   
B.  There Is No Constitutional Bar Preventing Magistrate Judges from 
Ruling on Third-Party Intervention  
The Constitution does not prevent a magistrate judge from ruling on a 
potential intervenor’s motion to intervene in a civil consent case.  This is 
because the exercise of a magistrate judge’s authority over the original 
parties’ case in a civil consent case does not implicate the potential 
 
 256. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text (noting that the Second Circuit treats 
a magistrate judge’s ruling on a motion to intervene in a civil consent case as a report and 
recommendation to the district judge, subject to de novo review upon the objection of the 
potential intervenor). 
 257. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 258. Review is for clear error when a potential intervenor moves to intervene as of right 
and is for abuse of discretion when a potential intervenor seeks permissive intervention. See 
7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 1923; supra Part I.C.2. 
 259. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 
 260. See supra Part II.B.  
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intervenors’ constitutional right to an Article III adjudicator deciding their 
motion to intervene.261 
While the Seventh and Ninth Circuits engaged in a statute-driven analysis 
and concluded that it is within magistrate judges’ authority to rule on a 
potential intervenor’s motion to intervene without consent,262 the Second 
Circuit looked to the importance of consent as a bar to magistrate judge 
authority.263  In doing so, the Second Circuit identified a constitutional 
dimension to the question of whether a magistrate judge, in a civil consent 
case, may decide a potential intervenor’s motion to intervene without 
consent.264  The Second Circuit requires a potential intervenor’s consent to 
magistrate judge jurisdiction at the outset upon a motion seeking leave to 
intervene.265  By requiring consent at the outset, the Second Circuit appears 
to implicitly recognize that a magistrate judge would exercise the judicial 
power in ruling on a potential intervenor’s motion to intervene.  Therefore, 
the Second Circuit has held that potential intervenors must waive their 
constitutional right to Article III adjudication by providing consent for a 
magistrate judge to decide their motion.  This position could explain the 
Second Circuit’s focus on the need for and the process by which consent is 
obtained.266 
However, as noted above, if a potential intervenor is permitted to 
participate in a lawsuit, that intervenor is free to withhold consent as a late-
coming party, thus transferring the case back to a district judge to evaluate 
the merits and dispose of the case.267  Further, a motion to intervene is a 
nondispositive motion268 that does not require a magistrate judge to dispose 
of the potential intervenor’s underlying substantive claim or defense.269  A 
magistrate judge reviews facts and applies law in evaluating the potential 
intervenor’s interest in someone else’s claim or defense,270 and no disposition 
is entered as to the potential intervenor’s underlying substantive claim or 
defense.271  Accordingly, the potential intervenor is generally not precluded 
from pursuing claims in a separate action if the motion is denied.272  
Magistrate judges ruling on a potential intervenor’s motion to intervene 
exercises the broad control and discretion granted to them by the original, 
consenting parties to manage what happens to their case;273 this power over 
 
 261. This Note does not dispute the constitutionality of the magistrate judge’s role or of 
magistrate judges’ authority over civil consent cases, which the Supreme Court noted has been 
upheld by all federal circuit courts of appeals. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra Part II.B. 
 263. See supra Part II.A. 
 264. If the late-coming party does not consent, jurisdiction over the case is transferred back 
from the magistrate judge to the district judge. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 265. See supra Part II.A. 
 266. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra Part III.B; supra note 162 and accompanying text; see also infra note 290. 
 268. See supra notes 243–50 and accompanying text; see also supra Parts I.C.2, III.A. 
 269. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 270. See supra notes 243–50 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra notes 243–50 and accompanying text. 
 272. See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 4438. 
 273. See supra notes 236–38 and accompanying text. 
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the original parties’ case should necessarily encompass the power to decide 
whether to open the case to a third party, who can always decline to consent, 
or keep it shut.274 
Further, even if a magistrate judge decides a potential intervenor’s motion 
without consent, the magistrate judge does so as an adjunct of the district 
courts, under the complete control of the Article III judiciary and never 
outside the overall and direct supervision of an Article III court.  There is 
opportunity for direct appellate review,275 and the magistrate judge’s 
exercise of authority remains inferior to the authority of the Supreme Court, 
as well as intermediate appellate courts.276  Magistrate judges are “connected 
to district judges to a degree far beyond any other non-Article III judge”277:  
the Judicial Conference of the United States authorizes new magistrate judge 
positions, district judges select magistrate judges and can remove them, and 
district judges control the cases that magistrate judges receive through 
referral processes.278  Moreover, the Supreme Court looks to the risk to the 
“institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch” created by transfers of 
jurisdiction from Article III courts to non–Article III adjudicators.279  But 
permitting a magistrate judge to rule on a motion to intervene without the 
potential intervenor’s consent does not represent the kind of “emasculating” 
transfer of jurisdiction to a non–Article III adjudicator that the Supreme 
Court would deem intolerable280 when the entire case is already within the 
magistrate judge’s jurisdiction after the original parties’ consent is given. 
Moreover, while the magistrate judge would, in some sense, be declaring 
the potential intervenor’s procedural relationship (or nonrelationship) to the 
litigation as an intervenor-party or as a nonparty outsider in ruling on the 
motion, this is not quite a declaratory judgment, which is a remedy with 
potential for future prophylactic effect.281  Intervention remains a procedural 
 
 274. See supra notes 74, 120 and accompanying text. 
 275. See supra note 222 and accompanying text; see also Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 
304 (1988). 
 276. This is consistent with what some scholars term the “appellate review theory” of 
judicial power, in which “Congress should be viewed as possessing relatively broad power to 
provide for Article I adjudication in the first instance, so long as sufficiently searching 
appellate review remains available in Article III courts.” Pfander, supra note 87, at 666.  This 
also appears to be consistent with the “inferior tribunals” theory of adjudication outside Article 
III, which recognizes a distinction between Article III “constitutional courts” and non–Article 
I adjudicative bodies, which must remain hierarchically inferior to the Supreme Court. See 
generally id. 
 277. See Andrew Chesley, Note, The Scope of United States Magistrate Judge Authority 
After Stern v. Marshall, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 757, 792 (2016). 
 278. See id. at 793; see also supra Part I.A. 
 279. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 (2015) (quoting 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)) (finding no 
impermissible threat to the “institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch” in permitting 
bankruptcy judges to decide state-law counterclaims, which would not be an “emasculating” 
transfer of jurisdiction to non–Article III adjudicators). 
 280. Id. 
 281. 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 1 (2019) (“A ‘declaratory judgment’ declares the 
rights of the parties or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law without ordering 
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mechanism permitting a litigant to join in the prosecution of or defense 
against a claim,282 rather than a declaration of the rights, duties, and 
obligations as to the underlying substantive claims and defenses 
themselves.283 
C.  Additional Policy Considerations  
In addition to the statutory and constitutional explanations for endorsing 
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ approach to magistrate judge jurisdiction 
over potential intervenors’ motions to intervene, practical implications and 
policy also bend in favor of permitting magistrate judges to rule on a motion 
to intervene in a civil consent case without the potential intervenor’s consent.  
Ultimately, this part argues that the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ precedent is 
more equitable than the Second Circuit’s precedent, avoids possible litigation 
gamesmanship, and is more efficient than the Second Circuit’s precedent. 
1.  Avoiding Inequities and Disincentivizes to Consent to Magistrate Judge 
Jurisdiction 
The circuits, in theory, differ with respect to the amount of appellate 
review available for a motion to intervene in civil consent cases, which not 
only creates inequity across circuits but also within circuits.  Because a 
magistrate judge’s ruling on a motion to intervene in civil consent cases in 
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits receives the same treatment as a district court 
judge’s (i.e., it is not treated as a report and recommendation),284 a magistrate 
judge’s denial of a motion to intervene in a civil consent case is directly 
appealable to a circuit court.285  This presents one opportunity to appeal a 
motion to intervene in a civil consent case, which is evaluated for clear error 
if a potential intervenor moves under FRCP 24(a), or for abuse of discretion 
if a potential intervenor moves under FRCP 24(b).286  In the Second Circuit, 
without the potential intervenor’s consent, a magistrate judge’s ruling on a 
motion to intervene in a civil consent case is treated as a report and 
recommendation to the district judge.287  Accordingly, it receives de novo 
review by the district court for any portion to which the potential intervenor 
objects.288  In theory, a potential intervenor can further appeal the district 
 
anything to be done.  . . .  Stated another way, a declaratory judgment declares rights, status, 
and other legal relationships, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.”). 
 282. See supra note 249 and accompanying text; supra Part I.C.1. 
 283. See 26 C.J.S., supra note 281, Declaratory Judgments § 1; Part I.C.1. 
 284. See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. County of Maui, 842 F.3d 681, 688 (9th Cir. 2016); People 
Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 171 F.3d 1083, 1089 (7th Cir. 1999); 
supra Parts II.B.1–2, III.A. 
 285. See Robert Ito Farm, 842 F.3d at 688; supra Parts II.B.1–2. 
 286. See supra notes 138–39, 235 and accompanying text; see also supra note 222 and 
accompanying text (noting the Ninth Circuit’s treatment, in Robert Ito Farm, of MOM Hui’s 
concern that it would not be able to appeal the denial of its motion to intervene if potential 
intervenors were held not to be parties within the meaning of § 636). 
 287. See New York Chinese V, 996 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1993); see also supra Part II.A. 
 288. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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court’s review of the report and recommendation to a circuit court, which 
would review the district court’s findings for clear error or for abuse of 
discretion.289  The Second Circuit’s rule then presents two opportunities to 
challenge a ruling on a motion to intervene in a civil consent case.  This rule 
creates inequities because the additional opportunity for review is only 
available to potential intervenors in cases where the original parties happened 
to consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction.  If the same case proceeds before 
a district judge because the parties happened not to consent to magistrate 
judge jurisdiction, then the potential intervenor will not receive the additional 
opportunity for review. 
Further, the Second Circuit rule may disincentivize consent to magistrate 
judge jurisdiction.  In the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, a potential intervenor 
has the same number of opportunities to appeal a denial of a motion to 
intervene regardless of whether a magistrate judge or a district judge decides 
the motion.  As a result, in the Second Circuit, potential intervenors who are 
concerned that their motion to intervene may be denied by a magistrate judge 
should, in theory, be incentivized not to consent to magistrate judge 
jurisdiction because they know ex ante that they may have two opportunities 
for review if their motion is denied, one of which would afford de novo 
review.  Further, as discussed in the next section, litigants seeking to delay 
the proceedings may also be incentivized not to consent to magistrate judge 
jurisdiction because they know ex ante that they may frustrate the litigation 
by introducing two stages of review rather than one.290 
2.  Speed of Litigation and Litigation Gamesmanship 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ rule is also preferable to the Second 
Circuit rule because it fosters the speedy disposition of litigation.  While 
potential intervenors may believe that they will receive quicker review of the 
denial of their motion to intervene in a district court than in a circuit court,291 
adding layers of review to the litigation process may make it more inefficient 
overall.292  Treating the magistrate’s order as a report and recommendation 
“inserts extra procedural steps (and an additional judge) into the process of 
deciding a motion.”293  This is a “less efficient means of ruling on a motion 
than if the motion were decided by one judge with authority to make a final 
determination.”294  And, additional layers of review for a motion to intervene 
 
 289. See supra notes 138–39, 235 and accompanying text. 
 290. An additional area of analysis may include whether the precedents discussed in this 
Note incentivize magistrate judges to either terminate or protect their jurisdiction.  That is, in 
the context where a magistrate judge’s ruling on a motion to intervene is not treated as a report 
and recommendation to the district judge, are magistrate judges incentivized to decide motions 
to intervene in order to transfer cases off or keep cases on their dockets?   
 291. See, e.g., Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. County of Maui, No. 14-00511, 2015 WL 134070, 
at *4 (D. Haw. Jan. 9, 2015) (“Proposed Intervenors chose to seek review only under § 636(b).  
This was, perhaps, a strategic decision, possibly made with the thought that this might result 
in expedited action by this court . . . .”), aff’d, 842 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 292. Lee & Davis, supra note 53, at 944. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
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may make litigation more costly; it increases the amount of legal briefing and 
advocacy and may inevitably lead to more billable hours charged.  As such, 
any rule regarding who decides a motion to intervene in civil consent cases 
should not be set to make the overall litigation process slower and more 
costly by requiring a district judge to review a magistrate judge’s ruling on a 
motion to intervene.  This is especially so considering that the magistrate 
judge role was created, in part, to free district judges to focus on more 
substantive matters by removing matters better suited for decision by 
magistrate judges from their dockets.295 
Treating a magistrate judge’s ruling on a motion to intervene as a report 
and recommendation in civil consent cases also creates the opportunity for 
unnecessary litigation gamesmanship.  The Second Circuit rule interjects a 
step that could slow the litigation down at critical junctures.  In New York 
Chinese V, the proposed intervenors moved to insert themselves in the 
litigation to challenge a settlement296—if they had undone the settlement, the 
litigation could have continued.  In People Who Care, the Seventh Circuit 
noted that requiring the three potential intervenors’ motion to be decided by 
a district judge and allowing them to enter the case would only create “delay, 
confusion, duplication of effort, the possibility of inconsistent 
determinations, and a drain on judicial resources”297 in a case that had been 
ongoing for nearly a decade.298  The Seventh Circuit noted that “to rule on 
the motion [the district judge] would have to familiarize himself with a case 
pending before another adjudicator, and the case would be frozen, as a 
practical matter, while he was mulling over his ruling.”299  In Robert Ito 
Farm, the case was moving quickly and the potential intervenors sought to 
participate in a summary judgment motion pending before the court300—the 
court wished to avoid delay.301  Further, the Supreme Court has indicated its 
wariness about litigation gamesmanship involving magistrate judge civil 
consent jurisdiction.302  Thus, the rule regarding who may decide third-party 
motions to intervene in civil consent cases should be set to limit litigation 
gamesmanship where possible.  As a result, the rule of the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits, which limits the ability of litigants to slow down the litigation 
 
 295. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 296. New York Chinese VI, 153 F.R.D. 69, 70 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d 43 F.3d 1458 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
 297. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 171 F.3d 1083, 1089 
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 298. Id. at 1085. 
 299. Id. at 1089. 
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Haw. Jan. 9, 2015), aff’d, 842 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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because it does not offer additional opportunities for objection and review, 
should be the rule of the federal courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The circuit split described in this Note should be resolved to permit 
magistrate judges to rule on third-party motions to intervene in civil consent 
cases without the consent of the potential intervenors.  This procedure, 
permitted by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, is within the broad statutory 
grant of magistrate judge authority over the original parties’ case in a civil 
consent case.  It honors the text and structure of § 636(c) by fostering 
consistency and ensuring that the rulings of magistrate judges in civil consent 
cases receive the same treatment as the rulings of district judges.  It also does 
not implicate the constitutional right to adjudication before an Article III 
adjudicator, identified by the Second Circuit as a constitutional dimension to 
the issue.  Ultimately, permitting magistrate judges to rule on potential 
intervenors’ motions to intervene without their consent promotes fairness by 
ensuring that litigants receive the same opportunities to challenge the denial 
of a motion to intervene across the country, no matter whether a magistrate 
judge or a district judge decides their motion.  The Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits’ precedent also allows the courts to preserve resources against 
litigation gamesmanship, thus increasing judicial efficiency.  Accordingly, 
the circuit split should be resolved in favor of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ 
precedent. 
